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because of the limited number of cases in which the time test and
corresponding different characterizations of obstinacy will be needed.
Few cases will require a determination of whether attorney's fees may
be assessed by a district court after an appeal is taken. To make the
Wright test more functional in these few cases, the Fourth Circuit
should carefully explain the precise differences between general and
merit-related obstinacy and supply more examples of the types of
conduct included under each heading. Finally, Thonen indicates that
state officials guilty of unreasonable bad faith conduct should expect
no eleventh amendment immunity from fee awards in the Fourth
Circuit. Under the Thonen doctrine, attorney's fees are likely to be
characterized as properly taxable costs incident to the litigation and
justified either as a means of obtaining prospective relief or as a
means to insure the orderly administration of justice.
MICHAEL J. RowAN
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Erie Doctrine: Appellate Review of State Law Questions and
the Status of Obsolescent State Decisions.
The rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' declares that federal
courts must apply state decisional law in cases based on diversity
jurisdiction. 2 Although simply stated, the rule has proved trouble-
some to apply.3 The recent case of Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co.' illustrates current difficulties the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has had in implementing the Erie doctrine.5 In Springer, the
Fourth Circuit avoided considering the effect of obsolescent state
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Id. at 78. See generally U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
1 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
510 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1975).
The Erie doctrine is really a composite of several Supreme Court decisions. C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 55 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
They include: Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456 (1967); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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decisions directly relevant to a legal issue in the diversity action.,
Moreover, the court failed to formulate a distinct standard for appel-
late review of state law questions.7 While most circuits give express
deference to a district court's construction of state law,' the standards
of the circuits are in conflict,9 and no uniform criterion for review has
been articulated by the Supreme Court.'0
The Rules of Decision Act declares that when a federal court sits
in a case based on diversity jurisdiction, the court must apply the
"laws of the several states."" In construing this statute, Erie estab-
lished that the forum state's case law as well as its statutes govern
decisions by a federal court.'2 After Erie, a federal court in a diversity
action effectively sits as a state court,'3 bound by authoritative deci-
I See text accompanying notes 72-78 infra. See also Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co.,
304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962). Although the Fourth Circuit departed from state preced-
ent in Shealy, Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity Action-Federal Court De-
termining State Law, 43 B.U.L. REV. 409, 413 (1963), the statutory construction in
Shealy was later implicitly approved by the forum state in Carolina Boat & Plastic
Co. v. Glascoat Distribs., Inc., 249 S.C. 49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967). The court thus
correctly anticipated the future development of state law.
I See text accompanying notes 43-46 infra. The Fourth Circuit has persistently
reviewed state law questions without recognizing the need to establish a distinct appel-
late standard. See, e.g., Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 505 F.2d 243 (4th
Cir. 1974); Denny v. Seaboard Lacquer, Inc., 487 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1973); McClung
v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940
(1973). But cf. Williams v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 378 F.2d 7, 8 (4th Cir. 1967) (indicating
when the Fourth Circuit may elect to defer to the district court).
I See cases cited in notes 38-40 infra and 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8, n.6.14 (Wright ed. 1960, Cum. Supp. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as BARRON & HOLZOFF].
9 E.g., compare United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th Cir. 1975), with
Peterson v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 39-
42 supra.
,See text accompanying notes 47-61 supra.
, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), amending Federal Judiciary Act § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
' The Supreme Court's decision, which ended the ability of a federal diversity
forum to resolve issues of state law based on federal common law principles, rested on
three bases: first, a revised statutory construction of the Rules of Decision Act,
presently 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970); second, the difficulties created by the rule of Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (authorizing federal courts to determine the law
in diversity cases irrespective of state decisions), see WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 54; and
third, the unconstitutionality of independently determined law for diversity cases. Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-80 (1938). The constitutional rationale has received
extensive criticism. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 56 and authorities cited therein; ALI
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 442 (1969).
11 E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
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sions of the state's highest court." As the Erie doctrine evolved, the
Court developed the objective of uniformity with the state forum"5 to
discourage forum-shopping"6 and to avoid the inequity of divergent
results.'7 By requiring federal courts to follow state decisions, how-
ever, Erie and its progeny have compounded the factors courts must
consider in formulating a rule of law in a diversity action.'" These
factors may be especially difficult for a circuit court to assess because
it is often unfamiliar with the law of the state, 9 thus creating prob-
lems of appellate review peculiar to diversity cases. These difficulties
in resolving issues of state law underlie the Fourth Circuit decision
in Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co."5
As a matter of substantive law, the Springer court determined the
extent of private industry's liability under North Carolina law for
water pollution damages.2 ' Springer, a downstream landowner,
brought a claim against Schlitz for alleged injury caused by inade-
quately treated effluent from an upstream brewery. The plaintiff
" Presently only decisions of the state court of last resort are binding in federal
court. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (dictum). See
generally text accompanying notes 86-97 infra.
" The danger of disparate results between state and federal courts prompted the
formulation of the "outcome determinative" test for identifying which of the forum
state's laws-whether putatively "substantive" or "procedural"-the federal court
must apply. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107-12 (1945).
"O The evil of forum-shopping is created in part by the federal removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), which allows a non-resident defendant the option of removing
the case to federal court-an option unavailable to a resident defendant. A non-
resident plaintiff can therefore choose whichever forum is most advantageous, secure
in the knowledge that his forum choice is final. If there is a significant disparity in the
results achieved in federal and state courts, then the choice of forum option operates
to the great disadvantage of a resident defendant. Erie, as embellished by Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), sought to restore neutrality to the federal forum.
In Guaranty Trust, Justice Frankfurter explained:
The nub of the policy that underlies [Erie R.R. v. Tompkins] is that
for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident liti-
gant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should
not lead to a substantially different result.
Id. at 109.
" Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
" For example, the court must identify state decisions relevant to a legal issue and
ascertain the scope and current validity of those decisions. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
" WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 240.
20 510 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1975).
2' For a fuller consideration of the environmental issues raised in this case, see
Comment, Environmental Law-Municipal Immunity-Springer v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Company: Placing the Burden on Industry, 53 N.C.L. REv. 1064 (1975).
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complained that at the time the defendant constructed its plant it
should have foreseen that its discharges would exceed the limited
capacity of Winston-Salem's water treatment facilities. 22 Moreover,
the plaintiff offered to prove that Schlitz failed to provide accurate
data to the city concerning the projected strength and volume of its
fluid waste. 23 Springer further claimed that the defendant's dis-
charges into the sewage system violated standards established by a
city ordinance24 and thus constituted negligence.
On the strength of prior state authority,n the district court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 21 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the facts alleged a claim be-
cause they fell within an exception to the immunity accorded users
of municipal sewage facilities under North Carolina law.27 The circuit
court also concluded that Springer had presented sufficient evidence
to support the allegations and remanded the case for a new trial.
The difference in holdings between the courts hinged on the inter-
pretation of state precedent. Both courts recognized the relevance of
the North Carolina cases of Clinard v. Town of Kernersville 28 and
Hampton v. Town of Spindale.2 These decisions held that a private
industrial user of a municipal sewage system is immune from liability
for injury caused after the user's waste enters the system. In narrowly
construing the immunity, the Fourth Circuit focused on a dictum
from Hampton which, in the court's opinion, "expressly restricts free-
dom from liability to those persons who use the sewers 'in the way
22 510 F.2d at 475-76.
" Id. at 476.
21 WINSTON-SALEM, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2(2) (1970).
25 Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Hampton
v. Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936).
11 510 F.2d at 470-71; see Record at 737, Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
Civil No. C-261-5-70 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 1973).
21 510 F.2d at 471.
- 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939). In Clinard, Kernersville constructed a new
treatment plant after the commencement of discharges by the corporate defendant.
The town then began dumping municipal waste into the creek on which plaintiff
possessed riparian rights. Plaintiff alleged that the waste from the corporation's up-
stream mill, inadequately treated by the town's plant, impaired the value of his prop-
erty. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, relying on its decision in
Hampton v. Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936), dismissed the suit
against the private industry. 215 N.C. at 748, 3 S.E.2d at 270.
2, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936). In Hampton, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina affirmed the dismissal of claims against private industrial defendants, basing
its decision upon the general immunity accorded persons using municipal treatment
facilities. 210 N.C. at 54-49, 187 S.E. at 776-77.
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prescribed by law.' "30 Because the Schlitz discharges could have
been found to exceed standards fixed by the Winston-Salem Code of
Ordinances3 and thus would have constituted a misdemeanor under
state law,32 the Fourth Circuit invoked the rule that proof of a statu-
tory violation constitutes negligence per se. The circuit court also
held that the immunity announced in Hampton and Clinard did not
preclude plaintiff's alternative claim that the defendant was liable
because it had actual or constructive knowledge of the inadequacy of
the city treatment facilities." In so holding, however, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion did not consider sensitive questions related to the
role of federal courts construing state law in diversity cases.
The Fourth Circuit's reversal on a matter of North Carolina law
failed to accord the deference which generally attaches to a district
court's determination of state law. 4 The reason for such deference is
well established. A circuit court, whose jurisdiction covers a number
of states, lacks the intimate familiarity which a district court pos-
sesses concerning the law of the forum state.35 Therefore, courts of
appeals have traditionally accorded great weight to the lower court's
determination of state law.3 Even the Fifth Circuit, which has shown
less reluctance than most circuit courts to review conclusions of state
law by a district court,37 has hesitated "to substitute [its] view of
10 510 F.2d at 472 (footnote omitted). In Hampton, the Court noted:
"But the inhabitants of a city who invoke its power to construct and
control a sewer, and who use the sewer after its completion for the
purpose and in the way prescribed by law, are not liable jointly with
the city for the damages which result to third persons from the negli-
gence of the city in the construction, management, or operation of the
sewer."
210 N.C. at 548, 187 S.E. at 776 (emphasis added), quoting 43 C.J. § 1916 at 1158-59
(1927).
"' WINSTON-SALEM, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 23-2(2) (1970).
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-4 (Repl. vol. 1969) provides that "[i]f any person shall
violate an ordinance of a county, city, or town, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
3 510 F.2d at 474-76.
3, WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 240. See cases cited in notes 38-40 infra and
BARRON & HOLZOFF, supra note 8, § 8 n.6.14. The deference to a district court's con-
struction of state law is criticized in Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts:
Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 747 (1964).
" WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 240. But see Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961), in which the court of appeals deferred to the expertise
of the district court, although the judge was sitting by assignment from outside the
state.
11 This deference is supported-if not compelled-by indications from the Su-
preme Court. See cases cited in note 50 infra.
31 E.g., compare United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th Cir. 1975), with
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state law for that of the district court sitting in that state and experi-
enced in its jurisprudence."38
The Fifth Circuit's reluctance is nevertheless tempered-if not
contradicted-by its willingness to review fully questions of state law
on appeal." In most other circuits, however, a district court declara-
tion of state law will be sustained on appeal unless the court of ap-
peals is convinced the holding is clearly erroneous." The "clearly
erroneous" position represents the most widely accepted rule among
Peterson v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970). See WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at
241; 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[2] n.15 (2d ed. 1959, Cum. Supp. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE].
u Peterson v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted). See, e.g.,
Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
985 (1974); Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1972).
11 E.g., Peterson v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970). Accord, Luke v. Ameri-
can Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the Eighth Circuit
apparently abandoned the clearly erroneous standard. The court concluded that its
previous standard effectively eliminated review of a district court's finding of state law.
While the court criticized its prior willingness to be bound by a district court's "per-
missible conclusion" of state law, it nevertheless commended the appellate review
posture of the Tenth, Ninth and Second Circuits, id. at 1019 n.6, all of which follow
the clearly erroneous standard. See note 40 infra. The Eighth Circuit failed to appre-
ciate that the "permissible conclusion" and clearly erroneous standards are identical.
E.g., Harris v. Hercules, Inc., 455 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir. 1972); National Bellas Hess
v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951). By confusing two analytically identical
standards, the Luke court may not have fully reasoned the decision to shift standards
of review. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit continues to cite Luke as the circuit's
definitive opinion on review of state issues. E.g., Carson v. National Bank of Commerce
Trust and Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974). See also MOORE, supra note 37,
0.309[2 n.15 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
40 E.g., United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129, 136 (10th Cir. 1975); American
Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 511 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); Lomartira v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550, 554
(2d Cir. 1967); Lee Shops, Inc. v. Schatten-Cypress Co., 350 F.2d 12, 17 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 980 (1966). For a less explicit proposition than the clearly
erroneous standard, see Wisconsin Screw Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 697,
701 (7th Cir. 1962) (where there is no compelling indication to the contrary, the court
accepts the view of the district court on doubtful questions of state law). But see
Buehler Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 495 F.2d 1211, 1214 (7th Cir. 1974).
Professor Wright describes the clearly erroneous standard as "treating the ques-
tion of state law much as if it were a question of fact." WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at
241; MOORE, supra note 37, 0.3092 at 136 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See generally FED. R.
Crv. P. 52(a). A more apt analogy is to the clearly erroneous standard for court review
of administrative findings. The standard is predicated in part upon a recognition of
the agency's greater expertise in the field. K. DAvis, ADMmnISTRATvE LAW TEXT § 29.02
(3d ed. 1972). In the federal court system, the district court is acknowledged as an
expert in matters of local law. E.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 240.
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the circuits." It also appears to yield results more acceptable to state
supreme courts" and is therefore more in harmony with the Erie goal
of uniformity with state decisions.
The Springer decision perpetuates uncertainty as to the standard
of review of state law questions in the Fourth Circuit. 3 The disposi-
tion of the district court firmly rested on state authority setting forth
a comprehensive immunity from pollution liability. The court of ap-
peals, however, reversed, relying on an insignificant dictum from the
Hampton decision" to hold that the immunity doctrine did not bar
1 See cases cited in note 40 supra.
42 Judge J. Skelly Wright, formerly a member of the Fifth Circuit bench, has
concluded that state supreme courts frequently repudiate the Fifth Circuit, which
shows relatively little deference to the decisions of its lower courts on issues of state
law. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE
L. REv. 317, 326 (1967). At the same time, the Seventh Circuit-which has shown
greater deference to district court decisions than the Fifth Circuit, see note 40
supra-has had its formulations generally well received by the states. Wright, supra
at 326-27. These indications suggest a possible nexus between accuracy and willingness
to confirm the district courts on matters of local law. Judge Wright, however, expressly
declines to offer an explanation for this phenomenon. Id. at 327.
Greater empirical research is needed to demonstrate conclusively whether the
clearly erroneous standard generally Yields a more accurate reflection of state law. The
answer to this question would be especially valuable to the Fourth Circuit, which has
not yet articulated a fixed standard of review. Of course, a circuit court should adopt
the more accurate standard to approach the Erie goal of uniformity, thereby reducing
the potential advantages of forum-shopping and achieving more equitable administra-
tion of the law. See generally note 46 infra.
11 See, e.g., cases cited in note 7 supra. The Fourth Circuit has never specified
when it must accept a lower court ruling regarding state law. In Williams v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 378 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1967), the Fourth Circuit stated that the court is
entitled to accept the expertise of the district court on a matter of local law, "especially
.. . when [the court's] conclusions are articulated with clarity and no contrary pre-
cedent. . . is at hand." Id. at 8. According to the Weyerhaeuser standards, the Fourth
Circuit could have elected to defer to the district court's determination of state law in
Springer. Disregarding the Hampton dictum as precedent, see note 44 infra, there is
no guiding statement by the Supreme Court of North Carolina concerning the breadth
of immunity to users of municipal sewage facilities except that which supports the
district court interpretation. In addition, as a basis for decision, the district court
indicated its conclusion that the Supreme Court of North Carolina would not overrule
its earlier case law. Record at 737, Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., Civil No.
C-261-5-70 (M.D.N.C., Oct. 12, 1973).
" The value of a dictum in the search for state law is a function of how carefully
considered the statement is. BARRON & HOLZOFF, supra note 8, § 8 at 41 (1960); WRmGrr,
supra note 5, § 58 at 239. In Hampton, the Supreme Court of North Carolina quoted
from two encyclopedias and a treatise for the immunity concept. Of the three sources
cited for the same proposition, only one encyclopedia contained the dictum mentioned.
There is no reason to conclude that the Supreme Court of North Carolina intended to
endorse and adopt the gratuitous dictum. Little deliberation, and therefore little
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suit against Schlitz.15 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, required less
than clear error to reverse in Springer. The opinion's silence, however,
does not necessarily imply that the court intended to reject the pre-
vailing clearly erroneous standard of review. The standard in the
Fourth Circuit, therefore, remains undefined. 6
In formulating standards of review for district court determina-
tions of state law, the circuit courts have not had the benefit of a
definitive Supreme Court decision on the issue. When federal juris-
diction is based on diversity, the Supreme Court has ultimate author-
ity to resolve a state law question. 7 Although the Court's rules ex-
pressly establish important state issues as a consideration governing
review on certiorari,48 in practice the Court rarely reviews questions
of state law.49 Whether the district courts or the circuit courts are to
have primacy on state law issues-subject to the potential check of
Supreme Court review-remains unsettled. The Court itself has de-
ferred to district courts in some decisions0 and to circuit courts of
weight, can be attributed to the dictum. As the Fifth Circuit noted, a federal court
"cannot, consistent with Erie, interpret state decisions as turning on elements that
were clearly insignificant to the deciding tribunals." Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America
v. Eagle, 484 F.2d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 1973).
510 F.2d at 472.
" One way the court could avoid the inflexibility of a rigid standard would be to
adopt a measure analogous to the sliding standard used in judicial review of adminis-
trative agencies. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § § 30.04-30.06 (3d ed. 1972).
The court could exercise full review of state issues or merely review for clear error,
depending on such objective factors as the lower court judge's relation to the forum
state, whether members of the circuit court belong to the state's bar, and the frequency
with which the circuit considers questions of the forum state's law.
'7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970).
The Supreme Court's rules provide for review "[wihere a court of appeals...
has decided an important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applica-
ble state or territorial law . . . ." Sup. CT. R. 19(1)(b).
" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 n.12 (1967). Under the Erie doctrine all federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, defer to the state's highest court on matters of
state law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Consequently, the United States
Supreme Court's determination of state law is only persuasive authority in state courts
and could therefore be ignored. See Hickey v. Kahl, 129 N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A.2d 33
(1941); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 708
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at
237. See also, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960),
expressly rejecting National Sur. Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957). One
commentator has concluded that the Supreme Court refrains from devoting its re-
sources to state law questions because of the Court's more pressing constitutional and
federal statutory responsibilities. Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts:
Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 747, 755-56 (1964).
51 E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956)
("Since the federal judge making those findings is from the Vermont bar, we give
1976]
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appeals in others.51 Occasionally it has indiscriminately deferred to
both tiers of the lower federal system. 2 The Court's decisions offer
little guidance, indicating only that while the district court decision
is entitled to great weight, a right to review by the court of appeals,
based on a heretofore unestablished standard, remains.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly determined a
standard of review for state law questions, 3 it did provide guidance
in Waialua Agricultural Co. v. Christian.4 In Waialua, decided
shortly after Erie, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
on a matter of territorial law in reliance on Erie policy." The Court
held that the court of appeals could not overturn a determination of
local law made by the territorial Supreme Court of Hawaii, despite
appellate jurisdiction exercised by the federal court," unless the
Hawaii court's decision was clearly erroneous. 7 A territorial court,
the Court reasoned, is likely to have a fuller understanding of the
local law of its jurisdiction than a circuit court.51 Moreover, the use
of Erie policy in Waialua apparently rested on the following reason-
ing: because territorial and state courts are analogous and under the
Erie doctrine state decisions are controlling, a circuit court must
therefore exercise restraint in reviewing a territorial court's determi-
nation of local law.59 Since the Supreme Court often similarly analog-
special weight to his statement of what the Vermont law is."); Steele v. General Mills,
Inc., 329 U.S. 433, 439 (1947); Diez v. Gonzalez y Lugo, 261 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1923);
cf. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39 (1941); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 499 (1941) (three-judge district courts).
5, E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 n.12 (1967); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1958); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236 (1944) ("It is
the duty of federal appellate courts ... to ascertain and apply the state law where
... it controls decision.") See Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 360 U.S. 273,
281 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein.
52 E.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943); MacGregor v. State Mut.
Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942).
0 But see Lomartira v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1967). The
Second Circuit is of the opinion that the Supreme Court decision of Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), endorsed the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Id. at 554. See generally text accompanying notes 62-71 infra.
305 U.S. 91 (1938).
5 See 350 U.S. at 107-09. Importantly, the decision did not simply rest on general
principles of federalism.
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128(a), 43 Stat. 936.
5 305 U.S. at 109. The Court used the term "manifest error" to describe the
standard.
11 See 305 U.S. at 106-09. See generally text accompanying notes 35 and 42 supra.
59 By elimination, the usual reasons given for the Erie rule-the avoidance of
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izes a district court sitting as a diversity forum to a state court,6 0 the
policy of Erie may also compel adoption of the clearly erroneous
standard of review for a district court's determination of state law."
Despite the Waialua rationale, the division and confusion among the
circuits as to the proper standard for state issues continues to make
the question appropriate for final resolution by the Supreme Court.
In addition to the unresolved standard of review in the Fourth
Circuit, Springer raised another significant issue in the application
of the Erie doctrine: the authority accorded potentially obsolete state
decisions in a diversity action. The Supreme Court faced this ques-
tion in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America.2 The substantive
issue in Bernhardt was whether, under Vermont law, a party would
be permitted unilaterally to disavow an agreement to arbitrate. 3 De-
cisions of the Vermont Supreme Court permitted revocation, and the
district court so held." Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a
concurring opinion, contended that a federal court need not mechani-
cally apply the state precedent.65 Because of the nationwide accept-
ance of arbitration since that state supreme court had last spoken,
he urged more vigorous scrutiny of the arbitration issue, even to the
extent of possibly disregarding the relevant Vermont cases.66 The
forum-shopping and prevention of inequitable, divergent results-could not have sup-
ported the use of Erie policy in Waialua. Because in 1938 the federal court exercised
appellate review over the Supreme Court of Hawaii, see note 56 supra, the Erie princi-
ple of uniformity would not have been transgressed by maintaining full review in
Waialua. Also, forum-shopping was not even a possibility when the case was decided.
Federal diversity jurisdiction did not cover controversies involving territorial citizens
until 1940-two years after the Waialua decision. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light &
Power Co., 83 F.2d 262, 266 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 689 (1936); Act of April
20, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-463, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143, amending 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1934).
10 E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
11 Cf. Lomartira v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 371 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1967).
12 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
Id. at 199-200.
"The district court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 122 F. Supp. 733,
734-35 (D. Vt. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956), held that two state decisions were dispositive: Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt.
132, 74 A. 1058 (1910), and Sartwell v. Sowles, 72 Vt. 270, 48 A. 11 (1900). Closer
analysis of these cases reveals that the Supreme Court of Vermont merely restated
without discussion the decision of Aspinwall v. Tousey, 2 Tyler 328 (Vt. 1803). The
federal court quite possibly bound itself to a rule which Vermont had not effectively
reviewed for over a century and a half. See 350 U.S. at 209, 211-12 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
11 305 U.S. at 208-12. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion was favorably
cited by the Fourth Circuit in Springer. 510 F.2d at 471.
" One commentator has concluded that Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
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Bernhardt majority did not accept the broader federal prerogative to
examine state law which Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opin-
ion advocated, 7 approving the district court's application of the old
state decisions.6 " In explaining its disposition of-the case, the Court
formulated certain indicia to measure the validity of obsolescent
state decisions: the clarity of the case law, the absence of developing
contrary authority, express doubts, or dicta undermining the rule
embodied in the precedent, and the lack of legislative development
to threaten its viability. 9
Bernhardt rejected the widespread acceptance of arbitration, both
as a current policy for efficiently settling contract disputes and as a
general development of the law, as a source of law justifying depar-
ture from established state precedent. 70 The district court could have
found that the Supreme Court of Vermont customarily favored policy
arguments and important new developments in the law and willingly
examined its own potentially archaic holdings in that light." To some
extent, therefore, Bernhardt limits the federal courts in ascertaining
the posture of the state's highest court. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion illustrates, the indicia of the Bernhardt decision may not
fully satisfy the uniformity objective of the Erie doctrine.
Nevertheless, Bernhardt is authority for federal courts to depart
from earlier state precedent when one of the enumerated conditions
is met. Examined against the Bernhardt indicia, North Carolina case
law does include a dictum contrary to the district court's holding in
Springer." Moreover, the state cases do not evince a clear intention
to create an exception to the rule of negligence per se for statutory
violations." Thus, according to the principles announced in
suggested for the first time that a federal court sitting as a diversity forum had a
greater role in ascertaining state law than the automatic application of all decisions
from the state's highest court. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court
and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 210 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Kurland].
61 Compare 350 U.S. at 204-05 with 350 U.S. at 209-12 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
68 350 U.S. at 204-05.
*' Id. at 205.
10 Compare 350 U.S. at 204-05 with 350 U.S. at 211-12 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). Similarly, in Springer the Fourth Circuit would have been precluded from find-
ing that the national evolution of environmental policy since the 1930's rendered the
Hampton-Clinard immunity obsolescent, if not obsolete.
7' See 350 U.S. at 209-12 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72 But see text accompanying note 44 supra.
See Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Hamp-
ton v. Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936).
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Bernhardt, the Fourth Circuit could look beyond the face of the im-
munity announced in Clinard and Hampton. The court, however, did
not regard the enactment of the ordinance allegedly violated by
Schlitz as a development which undermined the North Carolina rule.
Because the court represented Clinard and Hampton as limited hold-
ings rather than obsolete cases,"4 it could not take advantage of the
Bernhardt indicia, which were designed to assist federal courts in
modifying or refusing to apply state precedent whose authority had
lapsed.7 5 Conceptually, the Fourth Circuit purportedly followed stan-
dard principles of stare decisis.
Examined on the basis of strict stare decisis, the Fourth Circuit
simply refused to apply the North Carolina cases to their apparent
breadth. The Springer court placed great reliance on a statutory vio-
lation by Schlitz. It harmonized its holding with earlier state preced-
ent by relying on a dictum of apparent insignificance" from
Hampton. Even assuming the reliance on such dictum was justified
to qualify the scope of the North Carolina pollution immunity, its use
of dicta was not evenhanded. The Fourth Circuit failed to discuss an
equally important dictum from the Hampton decision which estab-
lished an alternative rationale for the immunity. The state decision
observed that pollution discharges treated by a municipal facility
cannot be the proximate cause of injury." Had the Fourth Circuit
71 See 510 F.2d at 471.
" See 350 U.S. at 204-05.
" See note 44 supra.
" The North Carolina Supreme Court in Hampton noted that the construction of
discharge facilities by a private party is not the proximate cause of a water pollution
nuisance. Rather, the proximate cause is the use of those facilities, which is solely the
municipality's responsibility. 210 N.C. at 548, 187 S.E. at 776, quoting 9 RULING CASE
LAW § 65 (1915) and citing Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, 116 F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902).
Carmichael noted that the defendants, private users of city sewage facilities, "were
improperly joined in this suit, not only because they were not jointly liable in damages
with the city, but also because their acts were not the proximate cause of the nuisance
.... " Id. at 851 (emphasis added). As well as support for the "proximate cause"
dictum, Carmichael is a significant case. In Springer, the Fourth Circuit described
Carmichael as the leading decision regarding the immunity of a municipal sewage
system's users. 510 F.2d at 474. The Fourth Circuit itself relied on the case to support
its use of independent contractor status as a benchmark for liability. 510 F.2d at 474-
75. Although the "proximate cause" language is a dictum, it must be evaluated with
reference to the holding and authority of Carmichael, which entitled it to more weight
than the admitted dictum which the Fourth Circuit used to harmonize its holding in
Springer with the North Carolina immunity. See note 44 supra.
By ignoring the "proximate cause" concept, the Fourth Circuit avoided expressly
contradicting a prior state opinion. The Fourth Circuit, however, could have justified
its disregard for the "proximate cause" dictum based on the evolution of tort law in
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applied this dictum, it would have reached the opposite result: even
if Schlitz had breached its duty of care to riparian owners by violating
the statute and negligently locating its plant, the cause of action
would fail for want of proximate causation.7 8 The Springer opinion
did not confront the literal scope of the pollution immunity, which
excludes the loopholes the court purported to find.
Although the Fourth Circuit's representation of Hampton and
Clinard as limited holdings amounted to an avoidance of the deci-
sions, the North Carolina Supreme Court might have agreed with the
circuit court's ultimate disposition in Springer by overruling or modi-
fying the obsolescent case law.7 9 Guided by the indicia Bernhardt
announced for diversity cases, the Fourth Circuit also could have
refused application of the obsolescent decisions. The approach the
court elected to follow, however, is misleading, even though the result
it reached may have been correct.
The Fourth Circuit's finesse in Springer may derive from the tra-
ditional reluctance of federal courts to question state decisions." Be-
cause Erie requires federal courts to defer to state authorities on
matters of state law in diversity cases, a federal court occupies an
awkward position when it is the first tribunal to question antiquated
state decisions.8 On the other hand, if the federal court mechanically
and unquestioningly applies the law of an obsolete decision, it trans-
gresses the principle of uniformity by risking an anomalous result.82
Although the Fourth Circuit's holding in Springer is inconsistent with
state precedent, the court did not suggest that time had eroded the
cases' validity. Yet by purporting to apply faithfully the law embod-
ied in North Carolina decisions, the court avoided the sensitive issue
North Carolina since Hampton. See Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754
(1962).
,1 The Fourth Circuit indicated in Springer that absence of proximate cause is
fatal to a claim, irrespective of the negligent nature of the activity. See 510 F.2d at
472-73.
71 See Carr v. Murrows Transfer, Inc., 262 N.C. 550, 554, 138 S.E.2d 228, 231
(1964), holding that an ordinance enacted for the protection and safety of the public
creates a presumptive right in the general public not to be harmed by a violation. The
Fourth Circuit could have viewed the municipal enactment as a partial overruling of
the Hampton-Clinard immunity. See generally note 78 supra.
,0 Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Determination of State Law in Diversity
Actions, 45 CAL. L. Rv. 87 (1957).
" See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand,
J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101 (1944).
11 If the federal court relies upon a case which would no longer be good law in the
forum state, uniformity is destroyed. See cases cited in note 94 infra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
of federal-state relations under circumstances in which abstention
was unavailable" and no certification provision existed to permit the
North Carolina Supreme Court to review its prior decisions."
As a means to avoid expressly refusing to apply" state precedent,
the practice of overlooking inconsistencies and finding facile excep-
tions to case law is not new. At one time federal courts were bound
to follow the decisions of any state court, not merely those of the
highest state court." As a result, the federal courts invented artificial
In Springer, the court could not avoid passing on the authority of state preced-
ent. Assuming no federal constitutional question, a federal court may not abstain in a
diversity action simply because the forum state's law is difficult to ascertain. County
of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 49, at 998-1005; MOORE,
supra note 37, 0.309[3]. However, when a case presents questions of state law related
to a significant state interest, the court may stay its proceedings pending the outcome
of a declaratory judgment action to determine the issue. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S.
Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (construction and state constitutionality of a state
statute); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (emi-
nent domain by a municipality). An alternative to a stay pending declaratory judg-
ment is available when the federal court certifies the question of state law to the state
court of last resort pursuant to rules adopted by the state court or enacted by the state
legislature. See note 84 infra.
" Some states have provided a means by which their supreme courts can receive
certified questions from federal courts. See Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
[Act] [Rule] in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 150 (1967), patterned after FLA. App. R. 4.61 and 5 FLA. STAT. §
25.031 (West 1974). In the Fourth Circuit, only Maryland has enacted this provision.
2B MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 161-72 (Repl. vol. 1973).
In addition to clarifying the forum state's law, these certification provisions can
help a federal court when it must, under the Erie doctrine, apply the law of another
state under the conflicts of law principles of the forum state. See generally Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 57. The
Supreme Court has endorsed the practice of certification in such circumstances. Leh-
man Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207, 212 (1960).
Aside from the advantages in a diversity action, certification provisions would
provide relief for three-judge district courts convened to consider the constitutionality
of a state statute. Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal
Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 n.44 (1960); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional
Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 344, 361-62 (1963). See generally ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICrION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 282-98 (1969).
1 The federal courts could not overrule state precedent because they lack the
authority. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"' WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 236-38. MOORE, supra note 37, 0.309[1]. In its
1940 term the Supreme Court handed down a series of cases espousing this principle.
One particular case in the group, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169
(1940), has received special notoriety. The Supreme Court held binding in the federal
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distinctions to emasculate lower state court precedent and thereby
exercise a measure of independent judgment.8 7 Similarly, prior to
Bernhardt federal courts presumed an inability to question precedent
from state courts of last resort, regardless of how antiquated.,
As the Erie doctrine evolved, the Supreme Court made inroads
into these mechanical rules.89 The Court established that decisions of
state trial and intermediate appellate courts are only persuasive-not
decisive-authority in the search to ascertain state law.9 In its
Bernhardt decision the Supreme Court further declared that federal
courts are not bound to adhere inflexibly to all decisions by a state's
highest court.9 While the practical effect of the Bernhardt holding
may have been to vitalize an arguably obsolete doctrine, its language
signals a more extensive role for the federal judiciary in construing
state law. The decision mandates a fuller look at state precedent to
determine its current validity. 2 Although once thought to demand
the automatic application of all state cases, the Erie doctrine no
longer embraces obsolete or otherwise unauthoritative decisional law.
court what Professor Hart described as "an obviously unsound decision" of a state trial
court. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
510 (1954). See WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 236-37; Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95
(1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775 (1941); Note,
The Ascertainment of State Law in a Federal Diversity Case, 40 IND. L.J. 541, 546-47
(1965). This line of cases provoked Judge Frank's remark that Erie compelled federal
courts "to play the role of ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state
..... " Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). See generally
Kurland, supra note 66, at 214.
1 Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 517-18
(1949).
98 Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Determination of State Law in Diversity
Actions, 45 CAL. L. REv. 87 (1957). See Kurland, supra note 66, at 210. In 1945 Judge
Clark complained that the Erie doctrine restricted the truly judicial quality of federal
courts by compelling adoption of "wooden precedent" which may no longer be current.
Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946).
81 By 1948 the Supreme Court had begun a retreat from its rigorous position. See
King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
11 Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (dictum). WRIGHT,
supra note 5, § 58 at 239. But see Comer v. Texaco, Inc., 514 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam); cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525-26 n.3 (1972) (a non-diversity
case).
11 350 U.S. at 204-05.
12 Professor Wright reads Bernhardt as allowing broad discretion to re-evaluate
obsolescent precedent. WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 58 at 238. See also Kurland, supra note
66, at 211-12 n.120; Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Appellate Defer-
ence or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REV. 747, 754-55 (1964).
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To achieve the Erie goals of uniform justice and prevention of
forum-shopping, a federal court should disregard precedent by the
highest court of the forum state when it appears that the state court
itself would modify or overrule that precedent.13 Indeed, some federal
courts have begun to recognize an obligation to scrutinize cases which
are potentially obsolete and reject those of lapsed validity. 4 Today a
federal court need no longer resort to judicial gymnastics to avoid
applying state case law which it believes to be archaic or less compre-
hensive than when declared."
The Springer decision epitomizes problems concerning the Erie
doctrine which the Fourth Circuit has evaded or ignored. Purporting
to follow stare decisis and refusing to address the literal breadth of
state precedent, Springer fails to guide the district courts of the
Fourth Circuit in evaluating potentially obsolete law. The opinion
' Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 31 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 985 (1974); Warner v. Gregory, 415 F.2d 1345, 1346 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 930 (1970); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.
1956); M.A.S., Inc. v. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp., 357 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1973);
United Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Nones, 283 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D.P.R. 1968). A
federal court should not, however, depart from state precedent for the purpose of
implementing its own notions of what the law ought to be. E. g., James v. United
States, 467 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1972); Kline v. Wheels by Kinney, Inc., 464 F.2d
184, 187 (4th Cir. 1972). Erie commands a detached appraisal of state law epitomized
by the doctrine of legal positivism: to ascertain what the law is rather than what the
law ought to be. Compare Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), with E. BODEN-
HEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE §§ 24-27 (rev. ed. 1974).
24 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Grey v. Hayes-
Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962), discussed in Comment, 17 ARK. L.
REv. 225 (1963); Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957), discussed in Comment, Application of Erie Rule Permits
Federal Court to Disregard State Holding in Favor of Subsequent Dictum, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 924 (1958); Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd as to
state law, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Caporossi v. Atlantic City, 220 F. Supp. 508
(D.C.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825
(1964). See Winston Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 508 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975); Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d
102 (4th Cir. 1962), discussed in Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity Ac-
tion-Federal Court Determining State Law, 43 B.U.L. REv. 409, 413 (1963). But see
Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.
1962), discussed in Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity Action-Federal Court
Determining State Law, 43 B.U.L. REv. 409 (1963).
,1 As Professor Corbin urged, the federal forum should "use its judicial brains, not
a pair of scissors and a paste pot." Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE
L.J. 762, 775 (1941). See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964). Judge Friendly suggests that Justice
Frankfurter's Bernhardt concurrence conforms to Corbin's views of "finding" state
law. Id. at 401.
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